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INTRODUCTION 
21 
In this country which has adopted a code law system， ifthere is one area 
where judges do make law under the strong in丑uenceof scholastic opinion， 
it is the area of international adjudicatory jurisdiction. Since Japan has “no 
statut田 expresslyprescribing international a司judicatoryjurisdiction， no treaties 
to be obeyed and no well-de五nedrules of international law which are generally 
recognized，'九 ithas been of great practical as well as theoretical importance 
to determine when a court can entertain a case which has a foreign element. 
The J apanese Supreme Court has long been silent about the problem of 
where to seek guidance for the jurisdictional determination， and other than a 
rather exceptional area of mibun-ho (family law and status)， 2 there have not been 
many cases decided in the lower courts. In the long awaited case of 1981， the 
Court五nallyaddressed itself to this problem.3 Judging from the amount of 
comment it generated， itmust be a crucial case. Yet it left several important 
questions unresolved and there is stil doubt as to the scope of the holding. 
Mter recounting the decision， this article examines， in two phases， the 
Court's doctrine vis-a-vis prevailing academic opinions. Against this theore-
tical background， some of the bases for international adjudicatory jurisdiction 
are discussed in order to highlight the limits of the current approaches taken by 
courts and writers.. It is suggested that future jurisdictional rules or theories 
must have such丑exibilityas to take account of various factors which make int-
ernational cases different from. purely local ones. 
* Assistant， Osaka University Faculty of Law. LL. B.， 1976， Osaka University Faculty 
of Law; LL. M.， 1979， Osaka University Graduate School of Law. 
1. Goto v. Malaysian Air1ine System Berhad， Supreme Court Judgement， October 16， 
1981， 35 Minshu 1224， English Translation， 26 JAP. ANN. INT'L. LAW 122 (1983). 
2. See Egawa， Interna抑制lDivorce Jurisdiction， 5 JAP. ANN INT'L LAW 1 (1961); See also 
Miura， Jud化ialJuri・'sdictionin Japanese Confiict of Laws: Stat叫 21AM. U. L. REv. 522 (1972). 
3. ~ote 1 supra. 
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1. THE MALAYSIAN AIRLINES CASE 
On December 4， 1977， a plane operated by appellant Malaysian Air1ine 
System Berhad (“Malaysian Air1ines") crashed in Johore Bahrn in Malaysia 
during a domestic flight from Penang to Kuala Lumpur. Subsequently the 
wife and two children of one of the deceased passengers brought a suit against 
Malaysian Air1ines in the N agoya District Court in J apan， seeking compensation 
for damages caused by the appellant's breach of the air transport contract which 
had been made in Malaysia between the deceased and the appellant company. 
The deceased Tomio Gotδwas a J apanese national and so were the appellees， 
his heirs. The appellant air1ine was a Malaysian corporation incorporated under 
the law of the Federation of Malaysia and had its head 0伍cethere. It had 
appointed a representative in J apan and had established a place of business in 
Tokyo. 
The Nagoya District Court dismissed the case stating that where the place of 
contracting， place of performance， and the site of crash were a1l10cated in Malay四
sia， a Malaysian rather than a Japanese court had adjudicatory jurisdiction.4 The 
court found that the fact the plaintiffs' place of residence and the defendant's 
place of business were in J apan did not amount to the special circumstances 
which would otherwise overturn the五ndingin favor of the forum of the de-
fendant's domicile.5 
On appeal the Nagoya High Court reversed and remanded to the district 
court.6 The defendants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal 
and held that Ma1aysian Air1ines should be reasonably subject to the jurisdiction 
of J apan， even though it was a foreign corporation with its head 0茸iceabroad. 
The opinion of the Court can be seen to comprise of four sets of proposi-
tions. First， the Court spoke in terms of internationallaw and set out a general 
principle: 
Generally speaking， adjudicatory jurisdiction shall be exercised as 
an effect of national sovereignty and the scope of adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion shall in principle be tantamount to that of national sovereign勺T.
4. Gotδv. Malaysian Air1ine System Berh註d，Nagoya District Court， Unreported， March 
15， 1979， English Translation， 25 JAP. ANN. INT'L LAW 167 (1982). 
5. See text accompanying notes 44-55 infra. 
6. Gotδv. Malaysian Airline System Berhad， Nagoya High Court Judgement， November 
12， 1979， 402 Hanrei Taimuzu 102. 
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Therefore， ifa defendant is a foreign corporation with its head 0鼠ce
abroad， itis general1y beyond the adjudicatory jurisdiction of Japan， 
unless it voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction.7 
The second set of propositions began with two exceptions the last of which 
is relevant to our present case: 
If a case is concerned with the land of J apan or if a defendant has a 
legal connection with J丘pan，he can be exceptionally subject to the ad他
judicatory jurisdiction of Japan， whatever his nationality is and whether 
he is.8 
How can one ascertain the limits of such exceptions? According to the 
Court， this is the problem of international adjudicatory jurisdiction. The third 
set of propositions referred to this question. 
With regard to the limits of such exceptions， we have no statutes 
prescribing international a司judicatoryjurisdiction， no treaties to be obey“ 
ed and no well-de五nedrules of international law which are generally re-
cognized. Under these circumstanses， itis reasonable to decide on 
international adjudicatory jurisdiction in accordance with the principles 
of justice and reason (jori) ， which would require fairness between the 
parties and fair and speedy administration of justice.9 
“Jδri" is a traditional J apanese concept which means principles of justice 
and reason or principle of natural reason， and may be employed by courts in 
the absence of proper statues or customs.10 Yet it is as vague as or perhaps 
more vague than the American counterpart “traditional notions of fair play and 
and substantial justice."ll The Court thus went on to substantiate the idea 
offδri in the last set of propositions by utilizing the territorial competence pro帽
visions in the Code of Civil Procedure.12 
7. Note 1 supra. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. See H. TANAKA， JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 175-77. 
11. International Shoe Co. v. Washington， 326 U. S. 310， 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
h在eyer，311 U. S. 457， 463 (1940)). 
12. Minji Soshoho (Law No. 29， 1890， asamended). 
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It should accord with these principles of justice and reason to subject 
a defendant to the jurisdiction of Japan if Japan has one of such contacts 
with the case as are set out in the Code of Civil Procedue as territorial 
competence. For example， when the defendant's residence (Article 2)， the 
o缶ceor place of business of a juridical person or any other association 
(Article 4)， the place of performance (Article 5)， the location of the de-
fendant's property (Article 8) or the place of tort (Artide 15)， etc.， are 
in Japan.13 
Applying the above principles to the facts of the case， the opinion concluded 
that the appellant-defendant foreign corporation should be reasonably subject 
to the jurisdiction of Japan where it had appointed a repr回entativein J apan 
and had established a place of business in Tokyo. 
I. ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Adjudicatory jurisdiction of a state is an aspect of its sovereignty， and 
foreign sovereigns and certain of their representatives are immune from suit.14 
There are also bilateral and multilateral treaties which limit adjudicatory juris噌
diction of a state.15 
Within this general framework of international law， each state determines 
whether or not its courts should exercise jurisdiction over a case which has a 
certain foreign element. This is the problem of international adjudicatory 
jurisdiction. In so far as the determination of international adjudicatory 
jurisdiction is stil dependent on each state， itis theoretically plausible to treat 
the problem solely from a national point of view. Under this“nationalism 
approach"， there is no practical and theoretical significance in discussing inter-
national adjudicatory jurisdiction and a court can be con五dentto take any case 
brought before it regardless of the case's international character and irrespective 
of interests which other states might have in adjudicating it.16 Even if one 
does not take this extreme view， international adjudicatory jurisdiction， atthe 
13. Note 1 supra. 
14. In re Matsuyama， Great Court of Judicature Decree， Dec. 28， 1928， 7 Minshu 1128. 
15. See， e.g.， Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cか operationand 
Security Between Japan and the United States of America， regarding Facilities and Areas and 
the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan，1960， 373 U. N. T. S. 207; Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations， adopted April 18， 1961， 500 U. N. T. S. 95. 
16. See， e.g.， French Civil Code， arts. 14 & 15. 
1984] JAPANESE COURT JURISDICTION IN 
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 
25 
present state of international law， isa matter of self-limitation on the part of a 
given forum state. Theorefore， ifwe are to achieve a decent and workable 
international order， we should establish decent and workable domestic rules for 
international adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
In the absence of statutory rules which directly regulate the problem of 
international adjudicatory jurisdiction， J apanese scholars and courts have con-
structed several theories to deal with it. Any of these theories can usually be 
seen to consist of two phases of discussions， the first phase of discussions being 
devoted to the nature of the subject itself and the second phase to the actual 
determination of international adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
The problems which arise in the五rstphase are primarily explanatory. 
One view thatwas predominant some decades ago seemed to believe that inter帽
national adjudicatory jurisdiction can generally be eXplained in terms of ter-
ritorial and personal principles of sovereigntyY This view iscriticized on 
the ground that the concepts of territorial and personal sovereignty do not offer 
statisfactory explanation for various situations presented by international trans幽
actions. For convenience， we shall cal1 this type of view the“sovereignty 
approach." The approach takes the position， aswe shall see later， that since 
there are no rules in both international and municipal laws to de1imit adjudi-
catory jurisdiction， the sum of territorial competences of J apanese courts is 
nothing but the extent of adjudicatory jurisdiction of Japan.18 Here， asin the 
nationalism approach， the concept of international adjudicatory jurisdiction 
五ndsno meaningful place. 
The Supreme Court， insetting out its五rstset of principles， re1ied on 
sovereignty.19 One commentator interpreted it as evidencing the Court's adop-
tion of the severeignty approach.20 However in the third set of propositions 
the Court explicitly admitted that international adjudicatory jurisdiction is an 
exception to adjudicatory jurisdiction which is an aspect of sovereignty， .and 
held that the boundaries of international adjudicatory jurisdiction should be 
delimited in accordance with the principles of justice and reason.21 Adjudi-
catory jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty， and the sovereignty approach can 
福 nodoubt explain ordinary cases of purely local nature. But the territorial 
and pers 
17. See H. KANEKO， MINJI SOSHOHo TAIKEI 66-67 (1957). 
18. ' See text accompanying notes 28-29 i17fra・
19. See text accompanying note 7 supra. 
20. See Goto， Case C017l17lent， 768 JURISUTO 278， 279 (1982). 
21. See text accompanying note 9 supra. 
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guidance to cope with borderline sItuations which may be more properly regulat-
ed by other principles.2 It would， therefore， be more appropriate to say that 
the Court recognized the limit of the sovereignty approach and turned to jori 
to resolve the borderline cases which are increasing in number as more transac-
tions are carried out across national borders. Perhaps the Court is to be com幽
mended for recognizing facts of life in the modern world， but its failure to 
expound the notions of jδri is not. The Court's position as to the nature of 
international adjudicatory jurisdiction may be cal1ed， the “exception approach." 
There is one view which now has virtual1y unanimous support from 
scholars， especial1y those in the五eldof international private law. According 
to this modern view， the principles of jori which are to五1the “legal vacuum，" 
as it were， of international adjudicatory jurisdiction should derive from the 
basic values of international civil procedure.23 The idea of international civil 
procedure is understood as“international cooperation among judicial organi-
zations of the world to share judicial functions in civil and commercial matters 
which arise from international private transactions between private persons."24 
Under this view， the problem of international adjudicatory jurisdiction is to 
decide how to al10cate judicial functions to judicial organizations of various 
states. Thus the determination of international adjudicatory jurisdiction can 
logical1y be compared to that of domestic territorial competence whose purpose 
is also to al10cate judicial competence territorial1y. If so， the same require-
ments of fair， just and e伍cientadministration of justice must be ful五lledin 
both processes.25 We may cal1 it the “international allocation approach." 
It is true that this approach must be pursued in the process of framing “hard-
and-fast rules" of international adjudicatory jurisdictioIl.26 It is certainly 
tempting to imagine that a national court could behave as if it were an inter岨
national tribunal in allocating international adjudicatory competence to a forum 
of another state. Yet it is practically di缶cultfor a court or even for the pro-
ponent of the approach to ascertain the extent of jurisdiction only relying on 
the basic values of international civil procedure. Thus most adherents of the 
international allocation approach also look to the domesti 
22. See Sawaki， Aφiudicatory Jurisdiction Revisited， 9 KOKUSAI SHOJI HOMU 611 (1981). 
23. See Ikehara， International Aφ'-udicatory Jurisdiction， 7 8HIN JITSUMU MINJISOSHO KδZA 
3 (1982). 
24. Id. at 16. 
25. See id. at 16-19. 
26. See Reese， General Course on Private Lηternational Lazv， 1976 RECUEIL DES COURS 1， 33 
(1977). 
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III. TERRITORIAL COMPETENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION 
27 
It would no doubt be desirable if adjudicatory jurisdiction of various states 
could be regulated by international1aw. But at present it is not very appealing 
to link the sovereignty approach with the view that the sum total of domestic 
territorial competences amounts to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of J apan. 28 
Under this view， ifa Japanese court has territorial competence over a particular 
case in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)， Japan has juris-
diction to adjudicate the case， regardless of its nature.29 
On the other hand， Japan has no jurisdiction to adjudicate a case with a 
foreign element if no bases of territorial competence under the CCP are located 
in J apan. 30 This approach， ifapplied without modification， leads to mechanical 
application . ofthe domestic competence rules to international cases. When 
based on the CCP provisions， itmay be called the “direct approach，" whereas 
more general1y itmay be cal1ed the “single聞factor-basisapproach.川 1 TheJormer 
name will serve our present purpose. The direct approach is vulnerable to 
the criticism that the application of the competence provisions irrespective 
of the case's international nature would give rise to some unreasonable results.32 
Unlike the direct approach， the Supreme Court interposed the notions of 
jori or the principles of justice and reason before it looked to the CCP. How-
ever in the last set of propositions， the Court seemed to develop an argument 
which would in effect produce the same results as the direct approach.33 The 
Court's language may be interpreted to mean that exercise of jurisdiction by 
a J apanese court is consistent with the principles of justice and reason in so 
far as it complies with a domestic competence rule.34 As a matter of fact the 
opinion concluded that the defendant foreign corporation was subject to J apan-
ese jurisdiction because it had a place of business in J apan， which is one of the 
27. See text accompanying notes 35-36 infra. 
28. See KANEKO， su.ρra note 17， at66. 
29. lbid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. See tex士accompanyingnotes 62~66 かげ'ra.
32. See lkehara， supra note 23， at17-18. See also text accompanying notes 57-58 infra. 
33. See text acconpanying note 13 supra. 
34. Takeshita， Case Analysis， 637 KINYU SHOJI HAN田 149 (1982). See also Gotδ， supra 
note 20 at 279. 
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bases for territorial competence. Thus we are faced with two questions as to 
the scope of the holding. First， did the COlIrt adopt a direct approach? Se-
cond， should the rationale of Malaysian Airlines be limited to the facts of the 
case or could it be generally applied to the situation where a foreign corporation 
has a place of business in J apan ? 
Perhaps the ultimate answers should wait until the Court or lower courts 
elaborate on these points. In the meantime the questions need to be explored 
as a matter of theory. The last question wil1 be discussed in the next section. 
As to the五rstquestion， itis plausible to conclude that the rationale of the Court 
would not amount to mechanical application of the CCP provisions because 
those provisions are seen to function as戸riprinc争les，not as statutory rules. 
Even when there is one of the bases for territorial competence in J apan， it is 
on1y prima facie accord with the principles of fδri to conclude that J apan has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate. If a court五ndsexercise of jurisdiction over a par目
ticular case inconsistent with the principles of justice and reason， itmay not 
“apply" a competence rule. If understood in this way， the Supreme Court 
approach may be categorized as a kind of“indirect approach." This observa-
tion is supported by a more practical reason. Under the direct approach， a 
district court can and must take the case with a foreign element if it白ldsany 
basis for territorial competence in J apan. Since the doctrine of orum non con-
veniens is unavailable in J apan， the court could not dismiss the case even when 
it would be more appropriate1y tried in some other state. This result is cer-
tainly contrary to the principles of justice and reason. 
The international allocation approach is linked with the view that interna-
tional allocation of adjudicatory jurisdiction should be regulated by the same 
principles of jori as intranational allocation for territorial competence， namely 
the principles of fair， just and e伍cientadministration of justice.35 五回ce
this view concludes that international allocation of juridiction is determined by 
essentially the same rules as intranational allocation of competence. However 
it calls attention to the need for international considerations when one infers 
jurisdictional rules from territorial competence provisions.36 In evaluating 
a particular assertion of jurisdiction， both this method and the Court'S approach 
35. See lkehara， supra note 23， at16. 
36. See id. at 19. 
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infers jurisdictional rules from the CCP provisions whereas the latter presumes， 
from the existence of territorial competence， that a J apanese court has juris-
diction to adjudicate. However， itis uncertain whether there is a practical dif-
ference between them. At least in theory， itshould be noted that while the 
“inferential method" is more fl.exible and may be more appropriate for creating 
internationally acceptable rules of jurisdiction， the Court's“presumptive method" 
seems more stable and predictable. At any rate， both methods may be categoriz-
ed under the name of indirect approach since they seek jurisdictional rules from 
the CCP by way of jori. 
The international allocation approach is also adopted by tho田 writerswho 
employ the balancing of interests approach in the jurisdictional determination. 
Some of them reject either form of the indirect approach， which more or less 
resort to the CCP provisions.3 7 The proponents of the balancing approach stress 
the di妊erencesbetween international allocation of jurisdiction and intranational 
allocation of territorial competence.3 8 They propose to make a jurisdictional 
decision by considering and cοmparing various factors such as the burden on the 
defendant to defend in a distant forum， the burden on the plainti旺tohave the 
forum of his choice denied and the forum state's interests in adjudicating the 
dispute.39 
A commentator who follows the inferential method criticizes the balancing 
approach on the ground that it would make prediction of jurisdictional decisions 
uncertain and unstable， and would thus discourage the parties from pursuing 
their int疋rests，and fetter the development of international transa心tions.40 But 
are the two approaches mutually exclusive? Perhaps what is needed is a change 
in emphasis. The balancing approach is certainly vulnerable ωthe above cri闇
ticizm if applied by and in itself. But it can be integrated into the indirect 
approach with success.41 The indirect approach bears an undesirable aspect， 
37. See， e.gリ Kosugi& Tatsuno jurisゐ・cti，開 alRequir，抑制仇 Recogni・'tioπ01Foreign 
judg，捌叫ん KOKUSAISHIHO NO SOTEN 162， 162-63 (1980). The Nagoya Di由 ictCourt in 
Malaysian Airlines adopted the same position and held，“…ln鈴rnationaljurisdiction and do・
mestic competence have distinct contents. This court thinks that the provisions for domestic 
competence cannot apply by analogy to int泡rnationaljurisdct 
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to the pure balancing-approach advocate， when it appears to focus solely on the 
CCP provisions.42 The inferential method is not very clear about how one 
can “infer" reasonable rules of jurisdiction from the territorial competence provi-
sions. The balancing approach may make the process of inferring more concre-
te and easier to understand by articulating relevant factors to be weighed. 
Particular1y， the international considerations it calls for wi1 require inquiry into 
“private interest factors" pertaining to the convenience of the litigants and 
“public interest factors" pertaining to the convenience of the forum， which 
are much amplified in the international arena.日 Andsurely the presumptive 
method needs a balancing process where international considerations are duly 
given， inso far as it refers to the principles of justice and reason. 
1V. THE DEFENDANT'S FORUM? 
J apanese courts follow the general principle ac伽 sequiturforum rei-
plaintiff must sue at defendant's domicile. This principle was laid down by 
Article 1 and paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A J apanese 
court sitting at the defendant's domicile can exercise jurisdiction over any act-
ion against him since it is his “general forum." 
The general forum of a corporation is ordinalily determined， asArticle 4， 
paragraph 1 provides，“by the location of its principal place of business， by 
the domicile of the principal person in charge of its affairs." However， para-
graph 3 provides: 
with regard to a foreign corporation， the provisions of paragraph 1 shall 
apply to the 0伍ce，place of business or person in charge of the affairs 
of such concern in J apan. 
Relying on this rule， the Malaysian Airlines Court sustained the jurisdiction 
of J apan. Is this result justified? Most commentators who disagree with 
the Court's conclusion turn to Article 9 rather than Article 4 to create a rule for 
(1982). The factors he proposes to consider are the interests of the pl均ltif，interests of the 
defendant， convinience of colecting evidence， forseability of the forum， and enforceability of 
the judgement. He found that balancing of these factors in the Malaysian Airlines did not 
override the general rule that a foreign ∞rporation with a place of business in Japan should be 
sued only in connection with the operation of that place of business. 
42. See Kosugi & Tatsuno， supra note 37 at 162-63. 
43. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert， 330 U. S. 501， 508-9 (1947). See Piper Aircraft 
Co. v. Reyno， _ U. S. -~ 102 S. Ct. 252 (1981). 
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international a司judicatoryjuisdiction.44 They propose a rule to the effect 
that a suit against a foreign corporation maintaining an 0伍ceor place of business 
in Japan may， only in so far as it concerns the a古iursof such an 0伍ceor place 
of business， be brought before a J apanese court.45 Since the victim made 
the air transport contract in Malaysia for a domestic丑ightwhich ended in a crash 
there， the suit could not be said to concern the affairs of the defendant's place 
of business in Tokyo. 
Opinions of the commentators who support the result vary. One commenta-
tor suggests that in a suit based on an air carrier's liabilities ensuing from an air 
accident， the forum of the plaintiff's domicile should have jurisdiction so far 
as the defendant air carrier does business internationally and has a place of busi-
ness in the forum state.46 Another commentator considers the fact that the defen-
dant was doing business in Japan as controllingY Despite the emphasis being 
di古'erentit is noteworthy tl蹴 ma町 ofthem seem to reぢona balancing approach 
in the五naljustifi.cation of the Court's ruling.48 Perhaps the most undesirable con-
sequence of taking anyapproach focusing on the territorial bases of the CCP， with 
or without the buffer of jari， would be that they often stop short of articulating 
the compelling reasons for their jurisdictional determination. Though not 
articulated in the Court's ruling， itwould be unrealistic to suppose that the fact 
that the plainti古swere the bereaved family of the victim and the defendant， an 
international airline doing continuous and substantial business in J apan， did not 
influence the Court's decision.49 The result of Malaysian Airlines could and 
should have been justi五edby a number of factors in addition to the defendant's 
place of business. 
We must now turn to the question which was raised previously. Should the 
Malysian Airlines rationale be limited to the facts of the case or should it be 
seen to extend to any stiuation where the defendant foreign corporation has 
44. See， e.g.， Ikehara supra note 23 at 25. 
45. See id. at 25. 
46. See Osuga， Case Comment， 729 JURISTO 143， 144 (1980). 
47. See Matsuoka， Jurisdictional Problems in Internatio叩 1Transactions 124廷ANDAIHOGA即
1， 6-7 (1982). 
48. See， e. g.， Goto supra note 17 at 280; Aoyama， Case Comment， 76 BESSATSU JURISTO 20， 
21 (1982); Takeshita， supra note 34 at 53-55;五在atsuoka，supra note 47 at 7; Ohara， Case Com-
ment， 296 HANREI HYORON 201， 204 (1983). After weighing a few factors， their balancing seemed 
to point toward the protection of the plaintifs. Some of the commentators refer to Artic1e 28 
of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 amended by the 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City as an 
indication of the recent' trend toward the protection of the plainti任inthe field of international 
air transportation. See， e.g.， Osuga supra note 46 at 144. 
49. See Shiozaki， A Comment on the Malaysian Airlines Case， 10 KOKUSAI SHOJI HOMU 
14， 22 (1982). 
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a place of business in J apan? In other words， isa Court justi五edin conc1uding 
that J apan has jurisdiction over the corporation simply because the Court五nds
a single factor， that is， itsplace of business in Japan? When a foreign cor-
poration has an 0伍ceor place of business in J apan， itis usually the case that it 
is doing continuous and substantial business there.50 If so， itdoes not seem 
to be inconsistent with the principles of justice and reason to require the corpora四
te defendant to defend any kind of suit there. After Malaysi，αn Airlines， there 
was one case which apparently based its decision on the defendant's place of 
business.51 This case is notable for two reasons. First， itindicates a direction 
in which the indirect approach may be developed. Second， it tested the reach 
of the Malaysian A介助zesin a different fact pattern. 
In Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance K. K. v. K. L. M. Royal Dutch Air-
lines，s2 the Japanese underwriter， standing in the consignee's place by way of 
subrogation， brought an action for damages， alleging breach of air transporta蝿
tion contract or tort， before the Tokyo District Court. The district court 
restated the basic principles of civil procedure set forth in Malaysian Airlines 
and reformulated the Supreme Court's presumtive method. It stated that if 
one of the CCP bases for territorial competence is located in J apan， itwould 
accord with the notions of fδri to sustain the jurisdiction of J apan “provided that 
there are no special circumstances that would produce unreasonable results as to 
frustrate the abovementioned basic values of civil procedure."53 
The advantage of this reformulation is that it compels a court to explain 
and justify why a single basis of domestic territorial competence may be used 
as a basis for international adjudicatory jurisdiction. In fact the district court 
reasoned: 
…it was the obvious fact that the defendant was an international air 
carrier doing business al1 over the wor1d. With its international business 
network and with the place of bussiness in J apan， we do not think it was 
impossible or considerably di伍cultfor the defendant to conduct neces-
sary defense activities here. Furthermore， the destination of the transpor-
50. Article 479 of the Commercial Code (Shoho. Law No. 48， 1899) provides that any 
foreign corporation intending to do business continuously in J apan shal register its ofice and a 
representative in Japan. However a foreign“corporation" can be sued even without the regis-
tration. See Article 46 of the CCP. 
51. Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance K. K. v.K. L. M. Royal Dutch Airlines， Tokyo 
District Court Interlocutory Judgment， September 27， 1982， 1075 Hanrei Jiho 137. 
52. lbid. 
53. Ibid. 
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tation contract between Shenker [the contracting carrier] and the de-
fendant … was an airport in J apan. The inconvenience incurred by 
the defendant is the cost it should bear for the bene五tsit receives from 
his wor1d噌wideactivities. Of course it is the obvious fact， too， that the 
plainti百isa large insurance company. Yet we do not believe that assert-
ing J apanese court jurisdiction in the instant case would be inconsistent 
with fairness to parties only on account of this fact. 
In light of the abovementioned ability of the parties， collecting of evi-
dence is not so di伍cultas to obstruct a fair and speedy trial.o4 
Thus the district court justi五edits exercise of jurisdiction over the Dutch co-
rporation. In the process of examining whether or not there are any “special 
circumstances" to overturn the general pattern， it is to be expected that the prin-
ciples of justice and reason wi1l be given content， not mere lip service; A 
development of practice in this direction wi1l ensure， to a certain degree， a 
fair and just determination of jurisdiction which gives due regard to the in-
ternational character of the case. 
The K. L. M. case demonstrated that the place of business rule of jurisdic-
tion is applicable to non-aiトcrashcases. Such factors as the relative economic 
postures of the litigants， the situs of evidentiary sources， or the destination of 
a transportation contract may not be controlling by and in themselves， but re-
quiring a foreign corporation to defend a suit in his “general forum" is surely 
justified if those factors point towards trial in that forum. At any event， tothe 
extent that the place of business rule (and hence the 0伍ceor the person in 
charge)55 is applicable to a transnational case， the principle actor sequitur forum rei 
is substantially modi五edin favor of the plaintiff. 
v. A PROSPECT FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
When a foreign defendant has no “general forum" in Japan， adjudicatory 
jurisdiction may be based on the “special forum" provisions of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Frequently utilized bases in transnational litigation are place of 
performance (Artic1e 5)， place of tort (Artic1e 15)， situs of attachable property 
(Artic1e 8) and consent (Artic1e 22).56 There is sti1l doubt as to what constitu-
54. Ibid. 
55. See Article 4， paragraph 3 of the CCP the pertinent part of which was quot疋dearlier. 
56. See generally F吋ita，忽抑制nationalLitigation - Conflict of Laws， in7 Z. KrTAGAWA ed.， 
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN ch. 5 (1981). 
34 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 31 
tes the place of performance， or place of tort. Suppose， for example， one takes 
the view that the former refers to the place of performance of the obligation 
to pay damages in breach of contract as well as the place of performing an origi-
nal1y contracted duty， it is highly di伍cultto determine the place of performance 
uniformly. The criticizm has been made that if such ambiguous concepts as 
the place of performance or place of tort are to be applied in transnational liti“ 
gation， a defendant might be forced to defend in an unforseeable forum which 
has sometimes nothing to d6 with trial convenience.57 Also questionable is the 
general applicability of Artic1e 8 to a case where the defendant has no other con-
nection with J apan than the presence of his property there. Many writers are 
willing to limit narrowly the Japanese rule of attachment jurisdiction to a case 
where the presence of the defendant's property is not temporary and its value 
IS su伍cientto satisfy the c1aim.5S 
General1y speaking， J apanese judges have taken a cautious attitude in apply幽
ing the CCP provisions to transnational cases.59 Most of the cases where J apanese 
jurisdiction was sustained had some other a伍liatingcircumstances than the statu-
tory bases， on which jurisdiction could have otherwise been grounded， and various 
factors which could have justi五edthe result.60 No doubt the signi五canceof 
the Supreme Court doctrine announced in Malaysian Airlines should ultimately 
be tested by lower courts in the context of the principles of justice and reason. 
'However， despite the Supreme Court'S fleeting reference to the CCP provisions， it 
might be reasonable to say that if past experience is any guide， Japanese courts will 
57. See， e.g.， Ikehara， supra note 23 at 26-27 & 31. 
58. See id. at 29. 
59. See， e.g.， Loustalot v. Admiral Sales Co.， Inc.， Tokyo District Court Judgement， June 1， 
1959，10 Kaminshu 1204 (Article 5 not applicable; since the burden on the parties is considerably 
heavier and transfer is not available in the international setting， it is not reasonable to regard al 
the teritorial competence provisions as the standard for jurisdictional determination); S. A. 
Rougemex v. Hoei Trading K. K.， Tokyo District Court Judgement， May 2， 1972， 667 Hanrei 
Jihδ47， English Translation， 18 JAP. .ANN. INT'L LAW 209 (1974) (enforcement of a French 
judgement denied; the place of performance provided in the CCP isnot regarded as a suficient 
connection to permit adjudicatory jurisdiction). 
60. See， e.g寸 K.K. Yamasho v. Transasiatic Inc.， Tokyo District Court Inter1ocutory 
Judgement， November 1， 1981，460 Hanrei Taimuzu 118 (Article 5 plus place of contracting); 
Sogo Koeki K. K. v. A. D. Svendborg， Tokyo DistrIct Court Judgement， October 17， 1967， 18
Kaminshu 1002， English Translation， 1JAP. ANN. INT'L LAW 136 (1967) (Articles 5 & 9); 
Yasutomi v. United Nether1ands Navigation Co.， Yokohama District Court Judgement， Sep幽
tember 29， 1966， 17 Kaminshu 874， English Translation， 1JAP. ANN. INT'L LAW 159 (1967) 
(Article 8， ship colision in Japanese waters， domicile of the injured plainti任"location and regis-
tration of the victimized ship); Yabutani v. The Boeing Company， Tokyo District Court Irト
ter1ocutory Judgement， July 24， 1974， 754 Hanrei Jiho 58， English Translation， 19 JAP. ANN. 
INT'L LAW 225 (1975) (Article 15， airaccident in Japan， forum forseeabi1i勺r，convenience of col-
lecting evidence， protection of the plaintifs). 
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not adopt the direct approach. 1n this respect， a version of the presumptive 
method reformulated in K. L. M. may be a correct restatement of what the 
law is and have utility as a rule of thumb for the immediate jurisdictional de-
termination.61 
A related， but often neglected problem is whether an a伍liatingcircumstance 
which is not provided in the CCP is accepted as the basis for adjudicatory 
jurisdiction. Apparently most J apanese legal literature fails to explore this 
problem. This is probably due to the fact that its main concern has been 
to modify (usually to limit narrowly) the CCP provisions to avoid the unreason-
able results of adopting the direct approach， which focuses solely on the CCP. 
1t is the weak point of the indirect approach that they too， focus on the statutory 
bases for domestic competence. Nonetheless there is no reason why the ques-
tion should be excluded from the theoretical horizon. The Supreme Court 
once recognized， though in an international divorce case， that the plaintiff's 
domoicile could exceptionally be a basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction. 62 The Court 
reasoned that the mechanical， rigid application of the defendant's domicile prirト
ciple“wi1 produce harsh results incompatible with the demands of justice and 
equity in international private relations and transactions." 63 Although this was an 
extraordinary case where the whereabout of the defendant husband was not known， 
it is theoretically necessary to examine， asa general matter， what circumstances 
could justify the overturning of the traditional bias in favor of the defendant. 
Another illustration of the inadequacy of both approaches is presented by Ya同
mazaki v. Takenaka K，δmuten Ltd.64 The plaintiff was injured in a tra伍caCCl-
dent in Thailand caused by one of the defendants， a J apanese national， who 
was driving the automobile at the time of the accident. The plaintiff五ledthe 
suit against the defendant stil11iving in Thailand， and his employers， a J apanese 
company， which was the owner of the automobi1e， ina district court of Japan 
seeking damages based on torts. The court， after balancing such factors as the 
inconvenience to the defendants， the burden on the plaintiff and the convenience 
of gathering evidendce， concluded that the inconvenience to the defendant em-
ployee was not so great as the plainti百，who was in hospital in J apan， would Su妊er，
and that litigation was more appropriately and e伍Cl
61. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra. 
62・ Chungv. Chung， Supreme Court Judgement， March 25， 1964， 18Minshu 486， English 
Translation， 5 JAP. ANN. INT'L LAW 175 (1961). See Egawa， Slφra note 2. 
63. Note 62 supra. 
64. Tokyo District Court Inter1ocutory Judgement， March 20， 1979， 925 Hanrei Jiho 
78， English Translation， 24 JAP. ANN. INT'L LAW 127 (1981). 
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The district court did not make any attempt to refer to any of the territorial 
competence rules， and resolved the question by the pure balancing approach. 
No satisfactory explanation has yet been made by the commentators who agree 
with the result but seek to derive an appropriate jurisdictional rule by modifing 
the competence rules.65 Furthermore the question has practical signi五cancewhen 
we think of the possibility that future legislation may expand as wel1 as limit the 
permissible basis for jurisdiction. Another possibility is that Japan may ratify a 
treaty which would deman<;l a change in our jurisdictional practice in a par欄
ticular五eld.6
If legal scholars are to contribute to the development of jurisdictional1aw， 
to the establishment of reasonable and manageable rules for international adj-
udicatory jurisdiction， their task is to evaluate the existing as well as probable 
bases for jurisdiction. An attempt should also be made to provide a list of 
factors which would justify a particular exercise of jurisdiction in terms of the 
principles of jusfice and reason. It is in this process that the balancing approach 
should come into play and be integrated into the indirect approach in the con幽
tour drawn by the international al1ocation approach.67 
CONCLUSION 
The rationale of Malaysian Aかlinescan at least be extended to a situation 
where a foreign corporation has an “o伍ce，place of business or person.in charge 
of the affairs of such concerns in Japan."68 The fact that a foreign corporation 
has， for example， a place of business in J apan， usually indicates that it is doing 
continuous and substantial business there. The same fact also suggests that the 
65. Watanabe， supra note 40 views Yamazaki v. Takenaka Komuten as a case of multiple de-
fendants. Article 21 of the CCP stipulates that where joinder of several defendants is proper 
and permissible， the plaintif can sue al the co幽defendantsin the same court in accordance 
with the provisions of Articles 1 to 20. However most writers are reluctant to utilize Article 
21 without qualification in the transnational seting. 
66. See， e.g.， Article 10 of the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
67. Yabutani v. The Boeing Co.， supra note 60， isa notable example of this “integrated" 
approach. The Tokyo District Court evaluated the place of injury rule obtained from Article 
15 of the CCP by a standard similar to the international allocation approach. It asked which 
state is the most appropriate forum to resolve the controversy from a view point of just， fair and 
eficient administration of justice. After stating that J apan cannot be a distant and unforseeable 
forum for the airplane manufacturer， the court further justified the application of the place of 
injury rule to the instant case by balancing such factors as the convenience of collecting evidence， 
the interest of the plaintif， and the interest of the defendant. 
68. Code of Civil Procedure， art. 4， para. 3. 
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corporation has some other connections with Japan. Under these circumstances， 
it . would not be contrary to the principles of justice and reason to require 
it to defend any types of action there. However the Court's laconic language 
should not be interpreted to mean that the mere existence of a place of business 
in Japan confers jurisdiction on a Japanese court. Neither should it be in-
terpreted as the Court's acknowlegement of the direct approach. Unless modiι 
ed， orjustified by other factors， a single-factor-basis for domestic territorial com-
petence can hardly be a reasonasble basis for international adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion. A better reformulation of the Malaysian Airlines rationale may be: A 
J apanese court may presume from the existence of territorial competence that 
it has jurisdiction to adjudicate a case with a foreign element， unless it五ndssome 
special circumstances which would bring about such an unreasonable result as 
to frustrate the principles of justice and reason. 
Yet legal theorists may not content themselves with the rule of thumb. 
If they are to look beyond the horizon of the law as it is， their efforts should 
also be directed towards the establishment of reasonable and workable rules for 
international adjudicatory jurisdiction. Their immediate task is to examine 
existing as well as possible bases for jurisdiction， from the wider perspective of 
the international allocation approach. At the same time an attempt should be 
made to enumerate those factors which would make a particular exercise of 
jurisdiction consistent with the principles of justice and reason. 
